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I n s t i t u t i o n a l  Choice and Soc ia l  Regulation: The Case of 
Environmental and Occupational Health Standards 
Giandomenico Majone 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Applied Systems Analysis 
The i n s t i t u t i o n a l  approach t o  pol icy  a n a l y s i s  r e s t s  on t h e  
simple bu t  important i n s i g h t  t h a t  ind iv idua l s  and groups pursue 
t h e i r  goals  i n  t h e  po l i cy  arena n o t  only by a c t i n g  wi th in  t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t s  set by t h e  given i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework, bu t  a l s o  
by at tempting t o  modify those c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  t h e i r  favor .  The 
impl ica t ions  of t h i s  extension of t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  model of r a t i o n a l  
choice,  i n  which i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  def ined exogenously, a r e  f a r -  
reaching. P o l i c i e s  which s e e m  super io r  when judged by c r i t e r i a  
r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e . t r a d i t i o n a 1  approach, l o s e  much of t h e i r  a t t r a c -  
t iveness  i n  t h e  extended model. 
I n  t h i s  paper I analyzesome recen t  a t tempts  t o  c g n t r o l  en- 
vironmental and occupat ional  hazards i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  and 
elsewhere. The purpose of t h e  a n a l y s i s  is  twofold. F i r s t ,  t o  
show t h e  importance of ins t i tu t ion-changing s t r a t e g i e s  i n  t h e  
formation of regula tory  pol icy .  Second, t o  argue t h a t  t h e  usual  
dichotomy of r egu la t ion  versus deregula t ion  o r ,  more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
"s tandards" versus " p r i c e  soLutions",  is  a spurious one--an a r t i -  
f a c t ,  a s  it were, of t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  model of s o c i a l  choice impli-  
c i t  i n  most po l i cy  analyses .  
The f a c t  t h a t  h e a l t h  s tandards a r e  unsa t i s f ac to ry  t o o l s  of 
pub l i c  pol icy  does not  prove t h a t  market so lu t i ons  a r e  nece s sa r i l y  
super io r  i n  terms of c r i t e r i a  which a r e  acceptable t o  t h e  pol icy  
a c t o r s  themselves. I n  f a c t ,  t h e  suggestion t h a t  economic e f f i c i ency  
should be t h e  b a s i c  c r i t e r i o n  i n  choosing among po l i cy  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
exemplif ies  a  p a r t i c u l a r  type of e f f o r t  aimed a t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
change--change i n  s o c i e t a l  values.  
1. The Trend toward Centralization of Control 
During the 1970s significant changes have taken place in 
the way industrialized countries go about protecting the living 
and working environment of their citizens. Nowhere have these 
changes been more remarkable then in the United States. Here 
a series of important legislative enactments--in particular, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Amendments 
to the Clean Air Act passed in the same year, the Safe Drinking 
Water Act of 1974, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, and 
the amended Clean Air Act of 1977--represent major shifts from 
previous models based on decentralized control and voluntary 
compliance, toward regulation at the national level by means of 
legally enforceable standards. 
The signiffcance of these institutional changes can be under- 
stood only in an historical context. The first federal law on 
air pollution control--the 1955 "Air Pollution Control--Research 
and Technical AssistanceM--essentially provided grants-in-aid for 
state and local air pollution control agencies. The role of the 
federal government was largely confined to the provision of technic- 
al advice and assistance, and the collection and publication of air 
pollution information by the Surgeon General. The Senate Report on 
the law reflects the then prevailing philosophy of limited federal 
intervention in environmental matters: 
The committee recognized that it is primarily the 
responsibility of state and local governments to 
prevent air pollution. The bill does not propose 
any exercise of police power by the federal govern- 
ment and no provision in it invades the sovereignty 
of states, countries or cities. There is no attempt 
to impose standards of purity. (1 ) 
The Clean Air Act of 1963 did little to establish a signi- 
ficant federal role in air pollution control other than assigning 
an important function for the federal government in identifying 
harmful pollutants. But Congressional attitudes had already 
changed by 1967, when:.a new Air Quality Act placed greater em- 
phasis on federal regulation. The primary responsibility for 
setting air quality standards and for developing implementation 
plans to attain the standards "within a reasonable time" was 
still placed on the states; but now the Secretary of the Depart- 
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was authorized to 
develop standards and implementation plans for states that failed 
to comply. Financial incentives for the establishment of air 
quality standards applicable to interstate air quality regions 
were provided in the form of 100 percent coverage of the 
costs of planning such interstate programs for the first two 
years, and the payment of up to 75 percent of such costs there- 
after. At the same time, the Secretary of HEW was granted ex- 
clusive authority to establish emission standards for new motor 
vehicles, except when a state had adopted stricter standards 
prior to March 30, 1966 (the obvious reference was to the state 
of California). 
Despite great initial hopes, the actual resultsofthe 1967Act 
were disappointing. The root cause of the failure, according to 
many analysts, was the fact that the Act had left to the states 
the major responsibility for implementation of the law's require- 
ments. The important Clean Air Amendments df 1970 represent the 
congressional response to the perceived inadequacies of previous 
legislation. While under the 1967 Act khe states were supposed 
to adopt their own air quality standards, now the newly formed 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was required to develop and 
promulgate national ambient air quality standards for pollutants 
for which criteria--documents summarizing the available scientific 
information about the influence of air pollution in ill health and 
property damage--had been issued. 
The states were required to develop state implementation plans 
(SIPs) to meet the air quality standards, and to do so by a "date 
certain"; if they failed, EPA would take over. To make sure that 
EPA would not evade the takeover requirement, the Amendements also 
provided for citizen enforcement: under section 304, citizens 
could sue EPA for not performing non-discretionary duties. 
Furthermore, the standard setting process was not to be delayed 
or watered down by cost or other non-health considerations. Sec- 
tion 5(g) of the 1963 Clean Air Act had proclaimed the necessity 
of giving "due consideration to the practicability of complying 
with such standards as may be applicable and to the physical and 
economic feasibility of securing abatement of any pollution proved ..." 
(the same position had been taken in the Senate's report on the 
1967 Act). Under the Amendments, however, health considerations 
would be sole determinants of air quality standards; and the stan- 
dards were to be set at levels capable of protecting the most sen- 
sitive segments of the population. 
In sum, EPA was to promulgate standards "with teeth", and the 
discretion of state and local agencies in implementing them would 
be severely limited by the requirements that acceptable SIPs be 
submitted to EPA. But this apparently logical division of responsi- 
bility concealed a serious danger for EPA. If the agency wanted 
to avoid assuming directly the financial and political costs of 
implementation (a fear which hadalreadyhauntedthe U.S. Public Health 
Service back in the 1950s, when discussion of air pollution abate- 
ment was 'still in its infancy), it had to bargain with the states 
rather than taking over their functions. And in order to bargain 
effectively, a certain amount of flexibility was needed regardless 
of legislative intent. This explains why considerations of eco- 
nomic and technical "feasibility" were included in the EPA guide- 
lines for SIPS, despite the fact that Congress had explicity denied 
the relevance of factors other than health in setting air quality 
standards. In this softening of the implementation guidelines EPA 
or, rather, the agency's first administrator, William D. Ruckelshaus, 
found a strong ally in President Nixon's Office of Management and 
Budget. (2 
The new Clean Air Amendments of 1977, while not including 
any major departures from previous legislation in this area, gave 
expression to a growing dissatisfaction with social regulation, 
and to new preoccupations created by the energy crisis. In the 
words of the Senate report, the new law attempted "to balance the 
economic aspirations of the country with the need for protection 
of the public health and welfare from the adverse impacts of air 
pollution". ( 3 )  The House report was equally explicit in stating 
the need for considering economic factors in determining acceptable 
levels of air quality. The health-only rule of 1970 had become an 
ambiguous "balancing rule" seven years later. 
By the summer of 1978 EPA was exposed to strong pressures, 
coming from such bodies as the Council of Economic Advisers and - 
the newly-formed Regulatory Analysis Review Group, to cut the costs 
of proposed health, safety and environmental regulations, The 
'difficulties of setting health standards with less than adequate 
information were also becoming increasingly clear. Industry spokes- 
men and even some independent researchers challenged existing 
standards, such as those for SO2, on the ground that the scientific 
evidence was inconclusive. EPA's understandable response was one 
of increasing risk aversion. For example, the agency began to 
issue warnings that the research needed for setting a sulfate stand- 
ard could not be completed by 1980 or 1981, as originally expected, 
and that, consequently, a standard might not be promulgated until 
1983 or later. (4) 
Legislative and administrative developments in the area of 
water pollution control follow a rather similar pattern, and will 
be mentioned only briefly here. Prior to the passage of the Safe 
Drinking Water Act of 1974 truly national standards for water quality 
did not exist in the United States, since regulation of intrastate 
drinking water quality was the responsibility of individual states. 
The findings of the National Water Commission Report of 1973 con- 
cerning serious inbalances in state and local regulations (so that, 
for example, people living in large cities usually had drinking 
water of higher quality than people in smaller communities), and 
the presence of potential human carcinogens in many drinking water 
systems revealed by a survey conducted by EPA in 1974, led to the 
demand for national regulation of drinking water quality. As the 
National Water Commission Report noted, there was a "need for a 
comprehensive restatement of policy to govern the role of the federal 
agencies meeting the nations's needs for municipal and industrial 
(5) water supplies" . 
Inadequate statutory authority,lack of centralized administra- 
tion and of forceful enforcement, large interstate differences in 
'drinking water standards: these were the problems Congress attempted 
to solve with the 1974 Act, and the promulgation, by EPA, of National 
Drinking Water Regulations. But again, as in the case of air pollu- 
tion control, it soon became clear that the federal government 
had to rely primarily on informal negotiations with state and 
local authorities, rather than on rigid enforcement of national 
standards. However, the physical characteristics of water pollu- 
tion problems--the fact that such problems are generally well de- 
fined by a river bed which touches many communities, so that fail- 
ures to implement controls on the part of one local agency become 
immediately apparent to all other agencies downstream--have made 
coordination among different jurisdictions somewhat easier than 
in the case of air pollution control. 
2. The OSH Act of 1970 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) is the first 
comprehensive attempt by the federal government to assure safe and 
healthful conditions for American workers. Prior to the passage 
of the Act, the federal government's involvement in the regulation 
of occupational health and safety was limited to- certain industries 
(e.g., mining, construction, and maritime), and certain businesses 
with federal contracts; the primary regulation of industry was at 
the state level. (6) AS in the case of environmental regulation, 
Congressional action was in response to widespread claims of in- 
effectiveness of state enforcement, and to the lack of uniform 
safety and health standards. 
The administrative agency responsible for administering the 
provisions of the Act is the Occupational Safety and Health Admini- 
stration (OSHA), located within the Department of Labor. OSHA is 
.required to set occupational safety and health standards, and to 
conduct inspections at workplaces to ensure compliance with the 
standards and with the "general duty" obligation of employers in 
all cases not covered by specific standards. 
Two more agencies have been established under the OSH Act: 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, a quasi- 
judicial review board which rules upon all challenged enforce- 
ment actions of OSHA; and the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH), a research body located within the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, NIOSH is responsible 
for developing occupational safety and health standards and re- 
commending them to OSHA, forconductingresearchinoccupationalhealth 
and safety, for training of personnel to enforce the Act, and for 
conducting risk evaluations. The agency is specifically required 
to publish a list of all known toxic substances and the concentra- 
tions at which these substances exhibit toxic effects. 
OSHA may promulgate a standard on its own initiative, in 
response to the petitions of employees or employers, or in re- 
sponse to the recommendations of NIOSH. It is interesting to 
note that from about 1940 to the passage of the OSH Act, private 
organizations such as the American Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) played the major' role in the de- 
velopment of occupational health standards in the United States 
and, indirectly, also in West Europe. The ACGIH's Threshold 
Limit Values (TLV) Committee, made up of nationally recognized 
toxicologists, industrial hygienists, and other experts not 
employed by private industry, has published lists of maximum 
acceptable concentrations (MAC) for hundreds of toxic substances. 
Though the occupational standards derived by the ACGIH were pre- 
sented only as voluntary guidelines for industry their influence 
on the development of industrial hygiene in the United States 
and abroad has been enormous. As one toxicologist writes: 
For nearly 35 years the ACGIH provided the leadership 
and council necessary to improve working conditions in 
the United States and many foreign countries. In fact, 
many western countries have adopted, almost in toto, the 
recommendations of the ACGIH. In 1971 OSHA promulgated 
the recommended TLVs of the ACGIH into law in the United 
States. (7) 
This is not to say that the methodology used by the ACGIH 
was wholly satisfactory. The recommended standards depended to 
a certain extent on professional judgment and confidential data, 
while documentation was often inadequate (although the situation 
had been improving, inthis and other respects, after 1962). 
According to some experts, as late as 1968 24% of all TLVs pub- 
lished by the ACGIH were based on analogy. (8 )  It was hoped that 
the OSH Act would be of decisive help in improving standard-setting 
methodology, as well as providing the first opportunity to develop 
uniform and legally enforceable national standards. 
State regulation, however, was the main target of the critics, 
especially labor unions and public-interest groups. Lack of suf- 
ficiently trained personnel and of research facilities, bureau- 
cratic inefficiency, "capture" by business interests, and reliance 
on simple warnings, rather than first-instance citations, in case 
of violation of occupational safety and health standards, were the 
most frequently mentioned failures of state regulation prior to 
the passing of the OSH Act. Hence, "[mlandatory standards,..., 
an informed and strong enforcement force, and a greater emphasis 
on occupational disease were seen to be necessary components of 
a sincere federal effort to reduce industrial accidents and disease. 
The embodiment of this effort was the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970". (8) 
The issue of state participation loomed large in the first 
years after the passage of the Act. In 1972, the President's 
Report on Occllpstibna~ Safety and Health had gointed out that 
"the purpose of the act is not to eliminate State safety and 
health programs but to include the States as major participants 
in the implementation of the Act as clearly stated in the 'Con- 
gressional Findings and Purposes'". In fact, Section 18 (b) 
states: 
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume respon- 
sibility for development and enforcement therein of 
occupational safety and health standards relating to 
any occupational safety or health issue with respect 
to which a Federal standard has been promulgated under 
section 6 shall submit a State plan for the develop- 
ment of such standards and their enforcement. (lo) 
Section 23 (a), (b) , (f) , and (g) provides that the federal 
government may pay up to 90% of the cost of developing state 
plans, and up to 50% of the cost of administering them. 
The conditions which a state plan must satisfy in order to 
be approved by the Secretary of Labor are listed in considerable 
detail on section 18(c). One of the most significant conditions 
is that state standards "are or will be at least as effective 
in providing safe and healthful employment" as the federal stand- 
ards. Also, state agencies are required to supply any informa- 
tion required by OSHA. Under section 18(f), the Secretary of 
Labor must make a continuing evaluation of the state plan, re- 
taining the right to withdraw approval for cause after affording 
a state adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 
By mid-1975 all states but five had submitted plans for 
consideration, and 22 state plans had been approved. It has 
been suggested that such a widespread submission of state plans 
may have been stimulated by industry opposition to the Act, and by 
Pres ident  Nixon's "New Federalism". ( I 2 )  Organized labor  feared 
a new s t a t e  takeover. A s  AFL-CIO President  George Meany wrote i n  
1974 ,  
Unless t h i s  regress ive  process can be stopped, every 
American worker covered by t h i s  Act w i l l  witness a 
r e tu rn  t o  the s i t u a t i o n  which caused t he  A c t  t o  be 
passed i n  t he  f i r s t  place--a fragmentized, weak-kneed 
and wavering decentra l ized system, impossible t o  
po l ice ,  becoming progressively more impotent as  b ig  
and small business pick it t o  p ieces  a t  t h e  s t a t e  
l eve l .  (13) 
A s  I s h a l l  argue i n  sec t ion  4 ,  it is doubtful  t h a t  t h i s  was 
a c o r r e c t  ana lys i s  of the  s i t u a t i o n .  Af ter  passage of the  A c t ,  
t he  s t r u c t u r e  of the  incen t ives  of t he  major pol icy  a c t o r s  had 
changed. Indust ry ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  no longer needed t o  concentrate  
resources on gaining influence a t  the s t a t e  l eve l .  OSH Act con- 
t a ined  a number of provisions which could be s k i l l f u l l y  used t o  
slow down f ede ra l  ac t ion.  I n  f a c t ,  i f  s t a t e  con t ro l  of occupa- 
t i o n a l  hea l th  matters  was s o  important t o  indust ry ,  how can w e  
explain t h a t  four  major i n d u s t r i a l  s t a t e s  (New Je rsey ,  New York, 
I l l i n o i s ,  and Wisconsin) had withdrawn plans previously underway 
i n  the f i r s t  s i x  months of 1975, and t h a t . f i v e  o ther  s t a t e s  ( in -  
cluding Georgia and Pennsylvania) had done t he  same p r i o r  t o  1975? 
I t  s e e m s  more reasonable t o  suppose t h a t  t he  50% funding provided 
by t he  Act d id  not  seem s u f f i c i e n t  t o  the s t a t e s  t o  compensate f o r  
the t echn ica l  and p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of implementing mandatory 
occupational hea l th  s tandards.  
The OSH Act has been characterized by George C. Guenther, 
former Ass i s tan t  Secretary of Labor f o r  Occupational Safety and 
Health, a s  " e s sen t i a l l y  a labor  s tandards law. . . i t s  h e a r t  is the  
development and enforcement of s a f e ty  and hea l th  s tandards".  ( 1 4 )  
Consequently, an ana lys i s  of t he  Act is, t o  a l a r g e  ex t en t ,  an 
ana lys i s  of t h e  r o l e  of s tandards  a s  t o o l s  of occupat ional  hea l th  
pol icy .  I n  a pol icy  context ,  t h e  two key ques t ions  a r e :  ( a )  who 
should s e t  and implement t h e  s tandards?,  and (b )  how should the  
s tandards  be s e t ?  
On t h e  f i r s t  i s s u e  t h e r e  had been considerable  debate  i n  Con- 
g ress  p r i o r  t o  passage of t h e  Act. I n  House and Senate b i l l s  in-  
troduced i n  August 1969 and again i n  September 1970, t h e  Republicans 
had proposed t h a t  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  s e t t i n g  and enforc ing  s tandards  be 
vested i n  a new National  Occupational Safe ty  and Health Board, whose 
members were t o  be appointed by t h e  Pres ident .  According t o  Demo- 
c r a t i c  b i l l s  introduced i n  January,  1969 and i n  March 1970, t h e  
Secre tary  of Labor should s e t  and enforce s tandards .  I n  December 
1970, a j o i n t  Senate  and House conference committee worked ou t  a 
f i n a l  version of t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  b i l l s .  Since unions have t r a d i -  
t i o n a l l y  considered t h e  Labor Department t h e i r  n a t u r a l  a l l y  i n  
Washington, t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  i s s u e  w a s  of t h e  utmost importance 
t o  them. According t o  t h e  Nader r e p o r t ,  " t h e  pressure  from t h e  
unions bore down on t h e  i s s u e  of who should set t h e  s tandards .  
Before t h e  conference had begun, t h e  union r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  ... had 
decided t h a t  what they wanted above a l l  else was t h a t  t h e  Depart- 
ment of Labor, and no t  a board, set t h e  s tandards .  I n  o rde r  t o  
reach t h i s  goal ,  t h e  unions were w i l l i n g  t o  make c e r t a i n  con- 
cess ions . . . " .  (1 5) I n  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  compromise, t h e  Sec re ta ry  of 
Labor w a s  given s tandard-se t t ing  and enforcement a u t h o r i t y ,  while  
a q u a s i - j u d i c i a l  Occupational Sa fe ty  and Health Review Commission 
received a u t h o r i t y  t o  e x e r c i s e  f i n a l  admin i s t r a t ive  review of en- 
forcement cases .  According t o  sec t ion  12, ( a )  and ( b ) ,  of t h e  
A c t ,  t h e  Commission is composed of t h r e e  members appointed by t h e  
Pres ident  f o r  terms of s i x  yea r s .  
The second i s sue ,  concerning t he  substant ive  c r i t e r i a  t o  be 
used i n  s e t t i n g  standards,  received much l e s s  a t t e n t i o n  i n  t he  
phase preceding passage of the  Act. Under sec t ion  6 (b)  (5)  a 
standard f o r  a t ox i c  mater ia l  must be s e t  a t  t h e  l eve l .  
which most adequately assures ,  t o  t h e  ex t en t  f e a s i b l e ,  
on t h e  bas i s  of t he  bes t  ava i lab le  evidence, t h a t  no 
employee w i l l  s u f f e r  mater ia l  impairment of hea l t h  o r  
funct ional  capaci ty even i f  such employee has regular  
exposure t o  t h e  hazard d e a l t  with by such standard f o r  
t he  period of h i s  working l i f e  ... In  addi t ion  t o  the  
at tainment of t h e  h ighes t  degree of hea l t h  and sa f e ty  
p ro tec t ion  f o r  t he  employee, o the r  considerat ions s h a l l  
be t h e  l a t e s t  ava i l ab l e  s c i e n t i f i c  da t a  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  
t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of t h e  s tandards,  and experience gained 
under t h i s  and o ther  hea l t h  and sa f e ty  laws. 
This is t h e  only place i n  t h e  s t a t u t e  where t h e  " f e a s i b i l i t y "  
requirement appears. According Doniger , (15) t h e  requirement 
was added t o  s ec t i on  6 (b )  (5)  by t h e  Senate Committee, on t he  
suggestion Senator J a v i t s .  I n  h i s  ind iv idua l  views a t tached 
t o  t h e  Report, the  Senator explained: 
A s  a r e s u l t  of t h i s  amendments, t h e  Secretary,  i n  
s e t t i n g  standards,  i s  expressely required t o  con- 
s i d e r  f e a s i b i l i t y  of proposed standards.  This is  
an improvement over [ t he  sec t ion  i n  t h e  absence of 
t he  amendment], which might be i n t e rp re t ed  t o  require  
absolute  hea l th  and sa f e ty  i n  a l l  cases ,  regardless  
of f e a s i b i l i t y  ...(I71 
The appropriateness of t he  t e r m  " f e a s i b i l i t y "  i n  t h i s  context  
is highly debatable,  but  the  comments of sena tor  J a v i t s  make c l e a r  
t he  r e a l  purpose of t h e  clause--to induce OSHA t o  consider  t h e  
cos t s  of regula t ion i n  s e t t i n g  hea l t h  s tandards.  
I n  view of t he  precedents (e .g. ,  sec t ion  5 (g )  of t h e  1963 
Clean A i r  A c t  s t a t i n g  t he  necess i ty  of giving due considerat ion 
t o  t h e  "'physical and economic f e a s i b i l i t y  of securing abatement 
-of any po l lu t ion  proved") ,  it seems unreasonable t o  argue, a s  
Ashford does, t h a t  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  requirement i n  t he  OSH Act 
probably meant only technological  f e a s i b i l i t y .  ( l a )  Rather, t he  
i n t e n t i o n a l  ambiguity of t h e  language has provided many poss ib i -  
l i t i e s  f o r  admin i s t r a t ive  d i s c r e t i o n ,  and f o r  l e g a l  oppos i t ion  
by ves ted  i n t e r e s t s  t o  proposed h e a l t h  s tandards .  I n  i t s  f i r s t  
1 0  years  of ex i s t ence ,  OSHA has  promulgated only t e n  new h e a l t h  
s tandards .  No carcinogen s tandard has been i s sued  a f t e r  t h e  ben- 
zene s tandard  was s t r u c k  down by t h e  Court of Aspeals of t h e  5 t h  
C i r c u i t  on October 5, 1978. 
3 .  A Model of I n s t i t u t i o n a l  Choice 
The b r i e f  h i s t o r i c a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  two preceding s e c t i o n s  
r evea l s  a common p a t t e r n  of development i n  environmental and occu- 
p a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  p o l i c i e s .  The advocates of an expanded f e d e r a l  
r o l e  i n  t h e s e  a reas  ( p u b l i c - i n t e r e s t  groups, organized l abor ,  
some p o l i t i c a l  en t repreneurs ,  and segments of t h e  f e d e r a l  bureau- 
cracy)  have succeeded i n  br inging about major s h i f t s  i n  s t a t u t o r y  
a u t h o r i t y  from s t a t e  and l o c a l  agencies  t o  t h e  f e d e r a l  l e v e l .  Y e t  
t h e  f r u i t s  of t h i s  v i c t o r y  have proved t o  be d isappoin t ing .  Federa l  
agencies  (OSHA and EPA) have been forced t o  assume a g r e a t e r  sha re  
of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l  c o s t s  of implementation than w a s  
o r i g i n a l l y  envisioned. Despite i n i t i a l  hopesof g r e a t  methodological 
progress ,  s tandard-se t t ing  s t i l l  remains an a r t  r a t h e r  than a s c i -  
ence. F i n a l l y ,  f e d e r a l  s tandards ,  though l e g a l l y  enforceable  a s  
demanded by unions and p u b l i c - i n t e r e s t  groups, have been few i n  
number and weakened, moreover, by " f e a s i b i l i t y "  requirements and 
l ack  of adequate s c i e n t i f i c  support .  
I n  t h i s  and t h e  following s e c t i o n ,  I s h a l l  argue t h a t  such 
r e s u l t s  can be explained i n  t e r m s  of a simple conceptual model of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change. The axiom on which t h e  model is  based i s  
t h a t  r a t i o n a l  pol icy  a c t o r s  do no t  take t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  frame- 
work as  given, but  pursue t h e i r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a l s o  by devoting 
resources toward obtaining favorable i n s t i t u t i o n a l  changes. 
I t  is important t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  t h i s  i n t u i t i v e l y  appealing 
assumption is fore ign t o  conventional pol icy  ana lys i s .  The gen- 
e r a l l y  accepted model of r a t i o n a l  choice i n  microeconomics and 
decision theory can besucc inc t ly  described a s  follows: a decis ion 
maker possessing c e r t a i n  resources and faced by an exogenously 
given set of cons t r a in t s ,  chooses from the set of f e a s i b l e  a l t e r -  
na t ives  the  one t h a t  maximizes h i s  u t i l i t y  funct ion.  I n  Pare t ian  
welfare economics, choice s i t u a t i o n s  fac ing an e n t i r e  soc ie ty  a r e  
modelled i n  an analogous way: the  pol icy  maker at tempts t o  maxi- 
mize a s o c i a l  welfare  funct ion W = W ( U , ,  U 2 ,  ..., Un) which depends 
pos i t i ve ly  on ind iv idua l s  ' u t i l i t y  l e v e l s ,  2 W/, > 0 , i = 1 , 2 , . . . , n ,  
I 
sub jec t  t o  a transformation cons t ra in t  T r e l a t i n g  the  goods and 
production f ac to r s  on which t he  individual  u t i l i t i e s  depend. Maxi- 
mization of W sub jec t  t o  t he  condit ion T = 0 s p e c i f i e s  t h e  welfare 
optimum i n  t e r m s  of t h e  amount of each f a c t o r  t o  be provided by 
each person and the  volume of each good t o  be consumed by each 
person. In  t h i s  view, maximization of welfare is  the  goal of pol- 
icy;  manipulation of cons t r a in t s  on individual  choice is  the  method 
used by t he  pol icy  maker. Thus, i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r y  t h e  r u l e s  
def in ing t h e  cons t r a in t s  within which p r i v a t e  t ransac t ions  take  p lace  
a r e  determined exogenously. A s  James Buchanan has pointed ou t ,  no 
bridge e x i s t s  between t h e  economic behavior of t he  ind iv idua l s  and 
groups a f fec ted  by t h e  r u l e s ,  and t h e i r  behavior a s  pa r t i c ipan t s  
i n  the p o l i t i c a l  process t h a t  produces t he  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  cons t r a in t s .  
But t h i s  model overlooks the  c r u c i a l l y  important f a c t  t h a t  
i n  pursuing t h e i r  goa l s ,  people not  only a c t  within a given set 
of cons t r a in t s ,  but w i l l  a l s o  s t r i v e  t o  modify those cons t ra in t s  
i n  t h e i r  favor,  using whatever means a r e  ava i lab le  t o  them (within 
limits s e t  by higher-order cons t r a in t s ) .  This is the  bas ic  i n s igh t  
on which a  more r e a l i s t i c  theory of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  choice may be 
buil t --a  theory i n  which individuals  and groups a r e  not  a r t i f i c i -  
a l l y  separated from the  decision processes t h a t  s e t  cons t ra in t s  on 
t h e i r  behavior. 
I n  order  t o  understand a  pa r t i cu l a r  process of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
choice (such a s  the passage of an environmental law, o r  the  s e t t i n g  
of hea l th  s tandards ) ,  and perhaps t o  fo recas t  i t s  l i k e l y  outcomes, 
it is  necessary t o  analyze i n  d e t a i l  ( a )  t h e  set of pol icy  ac to r s ,  
(b)  t h e i r  resources and cons t r a in t s ,  and ( c )  t h e  amount of informa- 
tion--including ideologies and cognit ive paradigms--that is  ava i l -  
able  t o  them. 
A s  Victor Goldberghas shown ( 1 9 )  , useful  i n s igh t s  can be ob- 
ta ined even under t h e  s implifying assumptions t h a t  pol icy  ac to r s  
e i t h e r  ac t independent lyor  i n  monolithic coa l i t i ons ;  t h a t  they 
have a  s i ng l e ,  homogeneous resource (say,  money) t o  a l l o c a t e  toward 
influencing i n s t i t u t i o n a l  choice; and t h a t  t h e  information avai l -  
able  t o  any ac to r  concerning the  consequences of a  given i n s t i t u -  
t i o n a l  change is  both imperfect and taken a s  given. Under these  
assumptions, one can conclude t h a t  each ac to r  w i l l  a l l o c a t e  h i s  
s c a r c e  resources i n  such a  way t h a t  the  expected marginal re tu rn  
of t he  l a s t  u n i t  of resource spent  on influencing i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  
any p a r t i c u l a r  pol icy a r ea  (o r  i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  j u r i sd i c t i on )  w i l l  
be roughly equal t o  t h e  benef i t  of the  l a s t  u n i t  of resource spent  
an any other  type of inf luence ,  and of the  marginal investment on 
any good. 
A s  t h e  above assumptions a r e  re laxed,  more complex p a t t e r n s  
of group behavior can be incorporated i n  t h e  model (20) . Consider 
f i r s t  t h e  assumption t h a t  i n t e r e s t  groups a c t  a s  a s i n g l e  ind iv i -  
dual  i n  p u r s u i t  of t h e i r  goals .  I n  f a c t ,  w e  know t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  
ac t i on  is always faced by t h e  " f r e e  r i d e r "  problem. A group goal 
such as s a f e r  working condi t ions ,  r ep resen t s  a publ ic  good which 
bene f i t s  a l l  employees, r egard less  of union membership. S imi la r ly ,  
a b e t t e r  environment b e n e f i t s  every person l i v i n g  i n  a given a r ea ,  
again independentof  h i s  o r  her d i r e c t  con t r ibu t ion  t o  environmen- 
t a l i s t  causes.  I n  t h i s  way, a c t u a l  o r  p o t e n t i a l  group members 
have incen t ives  t o  be f r e e  r i d e r s .  I f  t h e  amount of resources  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  a group depends s i g n i f i c a n t l y  on i ts  a b i l i t y  t o  in-  
duce o r  coerce i ts  members t o  con t r i bu t e  t o  t h e  common goal ,  t h e  
group leadership  w i l l  t r y  t o  ob ta in  r u l e s  f a c i l i t a t i n g  j o i n t  a c t i on  
on c e r t a i n  i s sues .  For example, unions may at tempt t o  ob ta in  l eg i s -  
l a t i o n  making s a f e t y  and hea l t h  i s s u e s  mandatory sub j ec t s  f o r  col-  
l e c t i v e  bargaining. Again, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of c lass-ac t ion  s u i t s  
aga in s t  p o l l u t e r s ,  o r  aga in s t  employers i n  t h e  f i e l d  of occupat ional  
hea l t h ,  f a c i l i t a t e s  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t i on  by reducing t h e  c o s t  of using 
t h e  cour t s  t o  enforce  claims. An important i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change, 
l i k e  t h e  passage of t h e  OSH Act, may even c r e a t e  oppor tun i t i e s  
around which new forms of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t i on  can be organized. 
Consider now t h e  na tu re  of t h e  resources ava i l ab l e  t o  the 
pol icy  ac to r s .  I n  t h e  po l i cy  arena many resources  o the r  than money 
(e.g. ,  votes ,  p o l i t i c a l  inf luence ,  e x p e r t i s e ,  and information)  a r e  
important; moreover, these  resources a r e  unequally d i s t r i b u t e d  
.among the  d i f f e r e n t  a c to r s .  L e s s  widely apprec ia ted  i s  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  comparative advantage which var ious  types of resources  
g ive  t o  t h e i r  owners depends on i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s .  Any given 
institutional framework tends to favor some resources more than 
others. For example, environmental and occupational health re- 
gulation affects the nature of property rights, reducing the power 
of capital relative to other resources such as political influence. 
Rule changes can also create new resources, for example, financial 
support for public participation in regulatory proceedings, or 
membership in advisory committees and administrative bodies. Hence 
policy actors will attempt to achieve institutional changes that 
give them new resources, or reward those with which they are re- 
latively well endowed. 
The problem of the information available to the policy actors 
remains to be discussed. Information is both incomplete and un- 
evenly distributed. In the words of N.A. Ashford, 
Inequality of access--for example, between management 
and labor or between large firms and small ones-- 
creates incentives for special interests to withold or 
distort potentially damaging (or beneficial) informa- 
tion. Differential access converts information into 
a bargaining advantage for the more knowledgeable party, 
and compounds the difficulties of public and private 
decision-makers who must evaluate the merits of a be- 
wildering variety of conflicting claims. Thus the 
phenomenon of differential access to information trans- 
forms the problem of improving our understanding from 
the purely scientific and technical realm of informa- 
tion generation, dissemination and utilization, to the 
"political" arena. ( 2 1  ) 
follows that policy actors have incentive invest 
resources in restructuring the institutional channels through 
which information is collected, evaluated, and disseminated. 
For example, the ability to influence the institutional setting 
or the composition of research bodies and advisory boards may 
significantly affect the kind of data that are collected, and 
the way in which they are evaluated. In some cases, even the 
choice of rules of evidence may become crucially important. 
Thus, i n  t he  case of toxicologic or  epidemiological evidence re- 
levant  t o  standard s e t t i n g ,  s t r i c t  s tandards of s c i e n t i f i c  proof 
imply t h a t  fewer exposure l i m i t s  can be determined while ,  a t  t he  
same t i m e ,  making l e g a l  challenges e a s i e r .  For t h i s  reason, ad- 
vocates and opponents of regula t ion tend t o  support d i f f e r e n t  r u l e s  
of evidence. 
A s  Victor  Goldberg has suggested, t he  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  model of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change can be extended t o  i nc l i de  e f f o r t s  t o  a l t e r  
cogni t ive  paradigms and c u l t u r a l  values.  Health regula t ion again 
provides many examples. Thus, whether o r n o t s a f e  thresholds  f o r  
carcinogens and o ther  t ox i c  substances e x i s t  i s  not  a quest ion t h a t  
can be d e f i n i t e l y  s e t t l e d  on t h e  bas i s  of ava i lab le  s c i e n t i f i c  know- 
ledge.. In  f a c t ,  it i s  doubtful  t h a t  t h e  i s sue  w i l l  ever be s e t t l e d  
fo r ,  i n  t h e  l a s t  ana lys i s ,  t he  answer depends on one 's  views con- 
cerning the  degree t o  which ' the  defense mechanisms of the  body can 
be s a f e l y  drawn upon t o  o f f s e t  i n s u l t s  from tox i c  agents.  Accord- 
ing  t o  what is probably t h e  p reva i l ing  opinion among tox i co log i s t s  
i n  t h e  West, no t h r e a t  t o  hea l th  e x i s t s  s o  long a s  t he  exposure does 
not  induce a disturbance capable of overloading the normal protec- 
t i v e  mechanisms of t he  body. However, some i n d u s t r i a l  t ox i co log i s t s  
i n  t h e  West, and t h e  majority of Sovie t  s c i e n t i s t s ,  maintain t h a t  
a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  ill hea l th  e x i s t s  a s  soon a s  t he  organism undergoes 
t h e  f i r s t  de tec tab le  change from i ts normal s t a t e .  
Neither  pos i t ion  can be dismissed i n  favor of t h e  o ther  a s  
being e i t h e r  unreasonable o r  contrary t o  es tab l i shed  b io log ica l  
laws, but  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  implicat ions i n  t e r m s  of acceptable l eve l s  
of exposure a r e  v a s t l y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  t h e  two cases.  ( 2 2 )  Individuals  
and groups favoring t h e  adoption of very s t r i c t  hea l th  s tandards 
support the  view t h a t  no s a f e  l eve l s  of exposure e x i s t  (and ge- 
n e r a l l y  a l s o  a "hea l th  only" approach t o  s tandard  s e t t i n g ) ,  while 
people concerned with t h e  c o s t s  of r egu la t ion  stress t h e  adapt- 
a b i l i t y  and r e s i l i e n c e  of t h e  human organism. The s t e p  from s c i -  
e n t i f i c  and pol icy  disagreements t o  genera l  phi losophica l  opposi- 
t i o n  can be s u r p r i s i n g l y  s h o r t .  Thus, a well-known American t o x i -  
c o l o g i s t ,  opposed threshold" approach t o  s tandard s e t t i n g ,  
argues t h a t  t o  keep concent ra t ions  of environmental agents  below 
one ' s  l e v e l  of percept ion  may produce 
a c r e a t u r e  [ t h a t ]  would have a Faust ian l i f e  span 
but  [one t h a t ]  could rece ive  no new knowledge, an 
ex i s t ence  ba re ly  removed from t h a t  of t h e  amoeba 
i n  i ts a b i l i t y  t o  experience t h e  world around it ... 
I t  seems t h a t  man is des t ined  t o  f a i l  and chal lenge ,  
t o  perce ive  and apprec ia te  h i s  world, but  a t  t h e  
c o s t  of mor ta l i ty .  Otherwise, what an immortal i ty ,  
what a l i f e !  ( 2 3 )  
Since veryconcre te  regula tory  dec i s ions  depend b a s i c  
phi losophica l  a t t i t u d e s ,  it i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  po l i cy  a c t o r s  
a l l o c a t e  resources  toward a l t e r i n g  s o c i e t a l  va lues  and b e l i e f s .  
I n  Goldberg's words, " t h e  c u l t u r a l  mi l i eu  i s  n o t  completely exo- 
genous" . ( 2 4 )  
4 .  The Model Applied 
The l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r i e s  ou t l ined  i n  s e c t i o n s  1 and 2 above 
o f f e r  a wealth of i n t e r e s t i n g  m a t e r i a l  t o  which t h e  model of i n -  
s t i t u t i o n a l  choice may be appl ied .  Here I can do l i t t l e  more than 
t o  suggest  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  OSH Act and its implementation. 
I n  t h e  next  s e c t i o n  poss ib le  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h e  r egu la to ry  phi lo-  
sophy embodied i n  t h e  Act w i l l  be discussed.  
I n  t h e  'arena of occupat ional  s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  t h e  major a c t o r s  
a re :  f e d e r a l  and s t a t e  bureaucracies ,  i n d u s t r i e s  and t h e i r  t r a d e  
a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  l o c a l  and n a t i o n a l  pub l i c - in te res t  groups, l o c a l  and 
n a t i o n a l  labor  organiza t ions .  On some i s s u e s ,  academic exper t s  
a s  w e l l  a s  governmental and i n d u s t r i a l  t ox i co log i s t s  have played 
a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e .  Nat ional  l abor  organiza t ions  w e r e  probably 
t h e  most determined opponents of s t a t e  r egu la t ion .  The reasons 
of t h i s  opposi t ion have been conveniently summarized by Ashford: (25) 
(1 )  The na t i ona l  unions w i l l  not  be ab l e  t o  exe r c i s e  
s u f f i c i e n t  in f luence  a t  t h e  s t a t e  l e v e l ,  s i nce  ( a )  ma- 
nagement organiza t ions  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  more powerful 
t he r e ,  (b )  l o c a l  unions lack t h e  e x p e r t i s e  and man- 
power t o  be a c t i v e ,  and (c) grass roo t s  worker support  
f o r  occupat ional  hea l t h  and s a f e t y  i s s u e s  i s  j u s t  be- 
ginning t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t ,  bu t  t h e  e f f ec t i venes s  of 
l o c a l  l eadersh ip  does no t  y e t  compare t o  t h a t  of t h e  
more pol icy-oriented na t iona l  union leadership .  (2) 
The poor record  of t h e  s t a t e s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  OSH A c t  
gives  suppor t  t o  t h e  be l i e f  t h a t  t h e  states w i l l  not  
do a good job. ( 3 )  Whatever t h e  arguments a r e  f o r  
s t a t e  takeover with regard t o  s a f e t y ,  t h e  s t a t e s  do 
no t  have t h e  resea rch  capab i l i t y  necessary t o  t a c k l e  
the  more severe  and prevalent  occupat ional  hea l t h  
problems. 
National  union l eaders  a r e  w e l l  aware of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of 
achieving s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  bene f i t s  through c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining. 
I s sues  concerning working condi t ions  tend t o  have low p r i o r i t y  i n  
t h e  bargaining agenda s i nce  f i n a n c i a l  ga ins  a r e  of more immediate 
i n t e r e s t  t o  workers and t h e i r  l o c a l  r ep resen ta t ives .  Hence, f e d e r a l  
l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t h i s  a r e a  s t rengthens  t h e  pos i t i on  of t h e  union 
l eadersh ip  with r e spec t  t o  t h e  rank and f i l e  and t o  t h e  unorganized 
members of t h e  workforce. The following statement  made by one union 
l eader  i n  an in terv iew with J O ~  Mendeloff ( 2 6 )  i s  q u i t e  reveal ing:  
The r e s t r a i n t s  on c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining a r e  very 
obvious; w e  d o n ' t  have t h e  power t o  g e t  t h a t  s t u f f  
from management. Co l lec t ive  bargaining could be 
used more, bu t  people tend t o  see themselves a s  
impotent. OSHA he lps  t o  focus on t h e  problem; 
how else could you g e t  na t i ona l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
problem of s e t t i n g  a l e v e l  f o r  some new mate r i a l  
l i k e  v iny l  ch lo r ide?  
This expla ins  why by 1970 a b i l l  on occupat ional  s a f e t y  and 
hea l t h  had become one of t h e  top  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r i o r i t i e s  of union 
leadership .  Moreover, s i n c e  regu la t ion  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  was t o  be 
done mostly by means of s tandards ,  it was important t h a t  stand- 
a rd - se t t ing  a u t h o r i t y  be ves ted  i n  a f e d e r a l  agency which l abor  
viewed a s  " i t s "  department, namely t h e  Department of Labor. A s  
mentioned i n  s e c t i o n  2 ,  organized labor  was success fu l  a l s o  on 
t h i s  score .  A c t i v i s t  groups suchas  Ralph Nader's Health Research 
Grouprand t h e  Environmental Defense Fund f u l l y  shared l a b o r ' s  
doubts about t h e  wi l l ingness  and c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  s t a t e s  t o  pro- 
v ide  adequate p ro tec t ion  i n  t h e  a r e a  of occupat ional  h e a l t h .  The 
not ion  of g iv ing  p r i o r i t y  t o  t h e  q u a l i t y  of working condi t ions  over 
the t r a d i t i o n a l  wage goa l s  of c o l l e c t i v e  barga in ing  w a s  a l s o  very 
much i n  l i n e  with the b a s i c  philosophy of t h e  environmental move- 
ment. I n  add i t ion ,  t h e  s h i f t  of regula tory  a u t h o r i t y  from t h e  
state t o  t h e  f e d e r a l  l e v e l  would produce s i g n i f i c a n t  economies 
of s c a l e  i n  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of inf luence  by such means a s  lobbying 
and nego t i a t ions .  Since some minimum threshold  expenditures  (e .g . ,  
t o  h i r e  a profess iona l  s t a f f )  must be made before  e f f e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
becomes poss ib le ,  n a t i o n a l  p u b l i c - i n t e r e s t  groups have a c l e a r  
i n t e r e s t  i n  concent ra t ing  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  i n  Washington, r a t h e r  than 
d i l u t i n g  them i n  50 s t a t e  c a p i t a l s .  
F i n a l l y ,  both l abor  and a c t i v i s t  groups f e l t  t h a t  t h e  exper- 
tise a v a i l a b l e  t o  indus t ry  i n  occupat ional  hea l th  and s a f e t y  could 
be matched only by a heavy presence of t h e  f e d e r a l  government i n  
t h i s  a rea .  On a number of occasions,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of organized 
l abor  and a c t i v i s t  groups have expressed t h e  need of compensating 
t h e  l imi ted  research  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t h e i r  organiza t ions  by g r e a t e r  
r e l i a n c e  on f e d e r a l  research  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The OSH Act seemed t o  
o f f e r  a number of i n t e r e s t i n g  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  
through t h e  c r e a t i o n  of. a Nat ional  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Occupational 
Safety and Health ( N I O S H ) ,  .and of advisory bodies whose mernber- 
sh ip  includes represen ta t ives  of labor  and of t h e  public .  
Tradi t ional ly ,  business groups have vigorously opposed any 
d i r e c t  f ede ra l  r o l e  i n  matters  of s a f e ty  and hea l th  i n  the  work- 
place,  arguing t h a t  t h i s  is a s t a t e  funct ion.  I t  has already been 
indicated  (see  sec t ion  2 )  t h a t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  passage of OSH Act i n  
1970, occupational hea l t h  s tandards w e r e  mostly developed by un- 
o f f i c i a l  groups l i k e  t h e  American Conference of Governmental In- 
d u s t r i a l  Hygienists and t he  American National Standards I n s t i t u t e ,  
and vo lun ta r i ly  adopted by industry a s  "consensus s tandards" o r  
guidel ines  f o r  good engineering prac t i ce .  
OSH Act has changed t h e  concept of occupational hea l t h  stand- 
ards  i n  t h r ee  s i g n i f i c a n t  ways. F i r s t ,  t h e  na t i ona l  s tandards a r e  
now l e g a l l y  enforceable.  Second, s tandards promulgated by OSHA 
a r e  no longer expressed only i n  t e r m  of exposure l i m i t s  but  in- 
clude sampling techniques, reference a n a l y t i c a l  methods, medical 
examinations, l abe l ing  of hazardnus conta iners  and a reas ,  work 
p rac t i ce s  f o r  hazard con t ro l  ( including t h e  use of p ro t ec t i ve  equip- 
ment and c l o t h i n g ) ,  app r i s a l  of employees of hazards t o  which they 
a r e  exposed a t  t h e  workplace, monitoring and record keeping of en- 
vironmental sampling, and medical examination r e s u l t s .  F ina l ly ,  
recommended standards must be based on publ ic ly  ava i lab le  informa- 
t i o n  t h a t  may be evaluated by anyone, including union representa- 
t i v e s  and other  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s .  (27) 
Clearly,  such changes imply heavier  cos t s  f o r  indust ry ;  s t r i c t e r  
regula t ions  amount t o  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r ede f in i t i on  of property r i g h t s .  
Y e t ,  i ndus t ry ' s  i n t e r e s t  i n  mounting a determined r e s i s t ance  t o  a 
federa l  takeover should no t  be exaggerated. For one th ing ,  even 
t h e  o ld  decentra l ized system of regula t ion was becoming increas ingly  
striagent. Pressures from ACGIH and other professional groups, 
and from the states, to reduce to a minimum worker exposure to 
carcinogens and other toxic substances had been increasing since 
the early 1960s. Thus, in 1961 beta-napthylamine was banned by 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and in 1967 regulations were 
issued requiring that a permit be obtained from the Commonwealth's 
Department of Health for industrial operations involving potential 
exposures to certain substances. (28) Also, interstate variations 
in the stringency of regulation threatened to introduce unfair com- 
petitive advantages for companies located in certain states, while 
complicating the administrative problems of compliance for firms 
operating in several states. 
Most importantly, industry must have realized, more clearly 
than anybody else, the enormous difficulties of setting and im- 
plementing defensible occupational health standards. The basic 
difficulties are of two types. First, the lack of a firm scientific 
foundation on which such standards could be based. For example, 
procedures used by toxicologists to determine "virtually safe doses" 
(VSD) for exposure to carcinogens involve extrapolations downward 
from the range of observed effects. A variety of equally plausible 
mathematical functions may be used in the extrapolation procedure, 
but the choice of function has a major effect on the determination 
of the VSD--more than 100,000-fold according to estimates of the 
Advisory Committee on Safety Evaluation of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration. (29) Equally uncertain is the relevance of animal 
experiments for the determination of human carcinogenic risks. ( 30) 
The second difficulty concerns the very nature of standards 
as policy tools. Voluntary standards and guidelines, such as those 
issued by the ACGIH and by NIOSH, can be determined on the basis of 
"hea l th  only" c r i t e r i a ,  s ince  they a r e  not meant t o  be regula tory  
instruments,  but r a t h e r  supply s c i e n t i f i c  inpu t s  t o  subsequent de- 
c i s ions .  Mandatory s tandards,  on t h e  o the r  hand, - a r e  po l i cy  t o o l s  
and a s  such must include,  more o r  l e s s  e x p l i c i t l y ,  cons idera t ions  
of cos t s  and bene f i t s ,  Typical ly,  es t imates  of economic impacts 
w i l l  be a t  l e a s t  a s  uncer ta in  a s  es t imates  of s a f e  dose l e v e l s  and 
o ther  b io log i ca l  parameters. 
To take  f u l l  advantage of t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  d i l a t o r y  t a c t i c s  
inherent  i n  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  and economic unce r t a in t i e s ,  indus t ry  
needed only a  few and apparent ly minor changes i n  t h e  language of 
t h e  s t a t u t e .  One such change was t h e  " f e a s i b i l i t y "  requirement 
added t o  sec t ion  6 ( b )  (5) of OSH Act by t h e  Senate Committee, on 
t h e  suggestion of Senator J a v i t s  (see sec t i on  2 ) .  Other procedural 
requirements, l i k e  t he  publ ica t ion  i n  t he  Federal Regis ter  of pro- 
posed standards,  and t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of p e t i t i o n  f o r  j u d i c i a l  re- 
view, can a l s o  be e f f e c t i v e l y  used t o  delay regula tory  ac t ion .  
The r e s u l t s  have been mentioned already.  I n  t en  years ,  OSHA has 
promulgated. only t en  hea l t h  standards: t h r e e  between 1970 and 
1974 (asbes tos ,  v iny l  ch lo r ide ,  and a group of 14 carc inogens) ,  
one i n  1976 (coke ovens) ,  and s i x  i n  1978 ( l ead ,  a r sen ic ,  DBCP, 
cotton dus t ,  a c r y l o n i t r i l e ,  and benzene). 
For example, i n  t h e  case  of the vinyl  chlor ide  (VC) standard 
set i n  1974, indus t ry  opposed the  proposed l e v e l  of 1 p a r t  per  
mi l l ion  ( 1  ppm) on t h e  grounds t h a t  OSHA lacked s u f f i c i e n t  evidence 
on t h e  harmfulness of VC a t  low doses; t h a t  it was technologica l ly  
impossible f o r  p l an t s  producing VC t o  m e e t  the  1 ppm ce i l i ng ;  and 
t h a t  t h e  c o s t  of approaching the  c e i l i n g  would force  t h e  companies 
out  of business.  Conceding the  i ndus t ry ' s  claims of i n f e a s i b i l i t y ,  
OSHA f i n a l l y  promulgated a  somewhat weakened permanent s tandard.  
Subsequent experience was t o  show t h a t  meeting the  1 ppm standard 
was not  a s  d i f f i c u l t  o r  cos t ly  a s  indust ry  had predicted.  
The convenient e l a s t i c i t y  of t he  f e a s i b i l i t y  requirement has 
been ap t ly  described by David Doniger i n  a de t a i l ed  case study of 
t he  VC standard: "OSHA's statements and ac t ions  suggest t h a t  it 
was following an unar t icula ted  p r inc ip l e  t h a t  a standard i s  not  
f e a s i b l e  i f  it would cause more than s l i g h t  changes i n  t h e  number 
of f i rms i n  an industry,  o r  i n  an indus t ry ' s  p r o f i t  and growth r a t e s ,  
i t s  output ,  and competitive pos i t ion" .  ( 31 ) According t o  Ashf ord ,  
even N I O S H ,  which i s  supposed t o  base its recommendations exclus ively  
on t he  "bes t  s c i e n t i f i c  judgment", objec t ively  determined, some- 
t i m e s  recommends c r i t e r i a  a t  variance with what is  suggested by 
t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  evidence alone. (32) 
A number of t r ade  associa t ions  watch c losely  OSHA's a c t i v i t i e s :  
The American I n d u s t r i a l  Health Council, an organizat ion expressely 
crea ted  f o r  t he  OSHA r u l e  making, t h e  Society of P l a s t i c  Indus t r i e s ,  
which has been p a r t i c u l a r l y  ac t i ve  i n  opposing t he  VC standard,  and 
t he  American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e ,  t he  organizat ion which defeated 
OSHA on the  benzene standard. No carcinogen standard has been pro- 
mulgated a f t e r  the  benzene standard has been inval idated  by t h e  
Court of Appeals f o r  the  5th Circ'uit on October 5,  1978.  The stand- 
ard was s t ruck  down because t h e  cour t  found t h a t  OSHA had f a i l e d  t o  
make quan t i t a t i ve  est imates of t he  bene f i t s  of t h e  s tandard,  and 
weigh them aga ins t  the  cos t s  t o  see i f  the  balance was "reasonable".  
What about t he  pos i t ion  of the  regulatory bureaucracy? An ex- 
panded federa l  r o l e  i n  the area  of occupational s a f e ty  and hea l th  
means, of course, an increase of budget, employment l e v e l s ,  and 
p o l i t i c a l  power f o r  the federa l  bureaucracy. However, it was not  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  guess t h a t  the  f i nanc i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  cos t s  of im- 
plementing occupational standards were likely to be high. There 
were precedents. In the case of air pollution control, for 
example, HEW'S Public Health Service had been unwilling, back in 
the mid-1950s, to become involved with the problems of abatement 
and control. "The health service apparently realized that any 
efforts to determine adverse levels of air pollution would lead 
to controversy, especially if it would have a role in recommending 
air quality or emission standards." (33) 
The prospects for the enforcement of occupational health 
regulation must have been even more alarming. Consequently, the 
possibility given by OSH Act to the states to develop and enforce 
their own standards, under OSHA's supervision, was compatible with 
the interest of the federal bureaucracy. According to Ashford, by 
early 1974 OSHA policy was "to shift to monitoring of state plans 
rather than continuing Federal enforcement activities upon commen- 
cement of enforcement by states with operational approved plans. 1, (34) 
It is easy to see that from OSHA's point of view this was an optimal 
strategy, since it minimized the agency's political costs. 
According to Section 18(c) of the Act, acceptable state plans 
must meet a number of specifications whose purpose is to ensure 
that state standards and implementation procedures (including right 
of entry and inspection without prior notice) be "at least as effec- 
tive" as federal standards and procedures. Once a state plan has 
been approved, the Secretary of Labor is required to make a con- 
tinuing evaluation of the state's performance, and to withdraw 
approval for substantial failure to comply; OSHA provides 50% of 
the funds necessary to run the state's program. In this way, all 
the political and half of the financial costs of implementation 
could be shifted to the states. At the same time, labor unions and 
publ ic - in te res t  groups were t o l d  t h a t  a s t a t e ' s  s tandards and en- 
forcement procedures would go j u s t  a s  f a r  a s  f ede ra l  e f f o r t s  to- 
ward reducing accidents  and deaths i n  t h e  workplace. 
The vagueness of the  s t a t u t o r y  language i n  connection with t h e  
approval of s t a t e  plans increases  OSHA's bargaining pos i t ion  with 
respect  t o  s t a t e  bureaucracies.  I n t e rp re t a t i on  of t he  " a t  l e a s t  
a s  e f f ec t i ve"  requirement is necessa r i ly  sub jec t ive ,  even when 
applied t o  such s p e c i f i c  items a s  exposure l eve l s  and number of 
inspectors .  I n  t he  case of the  "general duty" c lause  it becomes 
p r a c t i c a l l y  impossible t o  determine object ively  whether s t a t e  per- 
formance is  a t  l e a s t  a s  e f f e c t i v e  a s  f ede ra l  performance. Con- 
sequently,  t he  monitoring system gives a g r ea t  deal  of d i sc re t ionary  
au thor i ty  t o  OSHA and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  the  Ass i s tan t  Regional Direc- 
t o r s  f o r  Occupational Safety and Health. (35) 
Not a l l  s t a t e s  have been eager t o  grasp t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  
independent regula t ion offered t o  them by Section 18 of OSH Act. 
Major i n d u s t r i a l  s t a t e s  l i k e  New York, New Jersey,  I l l i n o i s ,  and 
Pennsylvania have chosen t o  withdraw plans previously submitted. 
Only 23 s t a t e s  operate today under OSHA-approved plans.  Like EPA 
i n  t h e  case of a i r  po l lu t ion  con t ro l  ( 3 6 )  , OSHA has been forced by 
the l og i c  of t he  s i t u a t i o n  t o  unwillingly exerc i se  i ts  power and 
t o  become the  t a r g e t  of sharp c r i t i c i s m  coming from management, 
labor ,  a c t i v i s t  groups, and even the  Council of Economic Advisers. 
5. EVALUATION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Recognizing the role of self-interest in the formation of 
,public policy is a source of insights, but also of potential mis- 
understandings. There is a real danger that an analysis of policy 
development in terms of the self-interested behavior of the actors 
may be interpreted as a mere rationalization of the prevailing 
power relations. Actually, the model of institutional choice 
contains no implication that the interaction of constrained self- 
interests will necessarily result in socially acceptable solutions. 
On the contrary, our preceding discussion shows that the resulting 
outcomes may be unsatisfactory for most or all of the actors -- 
though for different reasons. What .the model does imply is that 
normative recommendations should not be based on assumptions of 
ideal behavior of individuals and organizations, but on the 
realities of the policy process. 
In this spirit, I shall briefly evaluate the regulatory ap- 
proach embodied in the OSH Act and much recent environmental legis- 
lation in the United States, and then proceed to sketch some 
possible alternatives. Since the current approach relies so 
heavily on mandatory standards, the basic evaluative issue con- 
cerns the limitations of standards as regulatory tools. Our 
analysis indicates the following structural defects: 
Given the level of scientific knowledge available today or 
in the foreseeable future, the numerical precision of current 
standards is spurious. What is worse, the present cumbersome 
. process of standard setting does not allow the frequent re- 
visions which new evidence would require. For example, 
shortly after OSHA set the "permanent" standard for vinyl 
chloride at Ippm, new information became available that cancer 
had been induced in animals at precisely that level. But with 
1,500 to 2,000 known or suspected carcinogens yet to regulate, 
OSHA could hardly be expected to immediately reopen the VC 
proceedings. 
The most significant long-term effect of toxic substance and 
other occupational health standards should be to channel growth 
away from industries and materials that are hazardous to health, 
and towards safer forms of employment. Instead, under the 
pressure of "feasibility" requirements and "inflationary 
impact statementsn, there is a growing tendency for standards 
to merely codify existing technical and economic conditions. 
Moreover, since OSHA and other regulatory agencies rely on 
informal procedures in combining scientific evidence with 
economic and other considerations, the logic of the entire 
standard-setting process becomes opaque. In particular, no 
well-defined meaning can be attached to the chosen levels of 
exposure. 
Mandatory standards focus the attention of operators and 
inspectors on a small set of permissible values and approved 
practices, at the expense of more comprehensive assessments 
of the overall quality of ambient or workplace environment. 
The logic of statutory control is such that it is difficult 
to differentiate between the important and the trivial, be- 
tween form and substance. With no formal place for discretion 
in technical interpretation, the sitilation becomes one of 
either compliance or breach. 
a Yet flexible interpretation is crucially important, partic- 
ularly since few standards take synergism in chemical and 
environmental interactions into account. Since many health 
problems are apparently caused by combinations of various 
toxic substances, and by their interactions with environ- 
mental conditions and behavioral patterns, regulation of 
individual substances may represent an unproductive approach. 
At the same time, the enormous number of possible synergistic 
relationships rules out the possibility of complete coverage 
through formal regulation. 
Many critics of the OSHA approach to regulation have used 
the inadequacies of the current system of mandatory standards 
as proof of the need to reduce governmental intervention, and to 
place greater reliance on economic incentives. It has been 
suggested, for example, that employers be induced to provide 
safer workplaces by means of an "injury tax" (in the form of a 
certain percent surcharge of an employer's total injury loss) 
which would raise the marginal benefits of injury prevention. 
This critical literature has its counterpart in the area of en- 
vironmental problems. Here, too, the administrative approach 
to pollution control, based on standards and prohibitions, has 
been criticized for its lack of effectiveness, and for its ten- 
dency to become "a political process entailing bargaining between 
parties of unequal power". (37) Effluent charges and related 
price-based techniques have been proposed as alternative approaches 
.that by their automatism "would reduce the scope for adminis- 
trative discretion and bargaining". (38) 
But these normative conclusions overlook one.important 
point. The same forces that influence and distort the standard- 
setting process will also affect other approaches, perhaps by 
different means. The comparison between an uncorrupted system 
of effluent charges (or injury taxes), and a regulatory machinery 
captured by interest groups is a specious one. In fact, where 
effluent charges have been used, as in France, they have proved 
to be as subject to bargaining and as conditioned by institutional 
changes as standards, licenses, and other administrative mea- 
sures. (39) 
There is no reason to believe that market-oriented approaches 
to occupational safety and health would fare better. At any rate, 
solutions that are (theoretically) more efficient will also be 
more desirable only to the extent that economic efficiency is 
accepted as the overriding criterion of public policy. Such 
general acceptance is lacking in the policy areas discussed in 
this paper. Our analysis clarifies the reasons for this. Policy 
actors realize that the choice between standards and prices is 
not a technical choice between policy tools which are in them- 
selves neutral, but rather a decision between alternative insti- 
tutional frameworks which reward different groups differently. 
Hence some actors may, without being inconsistent, recognize that 
standards are less efficient than economic incentives, but at 
the same time support an inefficient regulatory machinery in 
which they have a greater voice. 
In order to break out of this dilemma, it may be necessary 
to imagine very different institutional settings --perhaps by 
reflecting on relevant experiences made in other countries. For 
example, the Western European approach to occupational health 
and safety differs from the American approach in a number of 
important aspects. Some of the characteristics of the European 
system, as discussed by Ashford (40 1 , are particularly significant 
in this context: 
o Standards are generally regarded as guidelines, and inspectors 
have considerable discretionary power. 
o First-instance citations are infrequent; warning and improve- 
ment notices are the major enforcement mechanisms. 
o However, inspectors have the power to issue prohibition 
notices forcing immediate discontinuance of dangerous 
activities. 
o European inspectors seem to be more specialized and better 
trained, and to enjoy greater prestige, than their American 
counterparts, and physicians are very often part of the 
inspectorate system. 
o Either works' councils or joint health and safety committees 
are usually mandated by law. 
o It is generally accepted that health and safety is the joint 
responsibility of management and labor. 
o Relative to the United States, a larger proportion of workers 
are organized; collective bargaining is often done at the 
federation rather than at the plant level. 
This brief list of characteristics is sufficient to suggest 
a certain pattern or style of regulation. Few mandatory stan- 
dards, but greater emphasis on guidelines and on the discretionary 
power of the inspectors. Less rigorous enforcement policy, but 
more reliance on consultative regulation and on "inspection with 
participative overtones". (41) Less use of legal tools, but a 
greater role for collective bargaining as an instrument of safety 
and occupational health policy. 
Such a model of "self-regulation" of hazards at the work- 
place by cooperative effort of-management and employees has been 
most clearly articulated in the recommendations of a British 
committee on safety and health at work (the "Robens Committee") 
which reported in July of 1972. In the words of the committee: 
A principal theme of this report is the need for 
greater acceptance of shared responsibility and 
more reliance on self-inspection and self-regula- 
tion and less on state regulation. This calls 
for a greater degree of real participatio 
process of decision-making at all levels. 4 4 1 f  the 
Despite initial opposition to the self-regulation philosophy 
of the Robens Report, which some people viewed as naive and 
others as advocating laissez-faire, the recommendations of the 
committee have provided the conceptual basis for the sweeping 
Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 (HASAWA).. A detailed dis- 
cussion of the HASAWA lies outside the scope of this paper, but 
it should be pointed out that the viability of the philosophy 
embodied in the Act depends on the satisfaction of some key in- 
stitutional conditions: a strong, respected, and well-trained 
inspectorate; an active presence of the unions at the plant level; 
employees who are sensitive to safety and health issues, and well 
informed of their rights of protection under the law; a respon- 
sible and cooperative management and strong penalties when needed. 
The extent to which these conditions are in fact satisfied 
in different Western European countries, and the possibility of 
generalizing particular national experiences in the area of oc- 
cupational health are significant topics for future research. 
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